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Abstract
How do different inflation-targeting regimes affect the monetary loss-function of a central
bank aiming at stabilizing inflation around an inflation target and stabilizing the real economy? Under a basic New-Keynesian framework, this paper examines the effect of inflationtargeting regimes on the monetary-loss function of a central bank. My analysis shows that
both strict and flexible-inflation targeting regimes lower monetary-welfare losses after the
adoption of the regime. However, strict-inflation targeters are able to lower monetary-welfare
losses by only focusing on inflation and nothing else. This provides evidence for the Divine
Coincidence, where a central bank can only focus on inflation and will subsequently have a
closed output gap.
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Introduction

How do different inflation-targeting regimes affect the monetary loss function for a central bank aiming at stabilizing inflation around an inflation target and stabilizing the real
economy represented by the output gap?1 Inflation targeting is a monetary-policy strategy
that was first introduced by New Zealand in 1989. Many central banks have adopted inflation targeting as a pragmatic response to the failures of money-supply targeting. Monetary
targeting was met with limited success because the demand for money became unstable,
typically because of innovations in the financial markets. Inflation targeting is characterized
by the public announcement of official quantitative targets, or ranges, for example, the inflation rate over a certain time horizon, and an unambiguous knowledge that low and stable
inflation is the primary long-term goal of monetary policy. Under inflation targeting, there
is a high degree of transparency and accountability among central banks. For example, central banks lead efforts to communicate with the public about their plans and objectives for
monetary policy, which leads to strengthening the central bank's credibility and increasing
their accountability for obtaining those objectives, setting a strong nominal anchor for the
economy.
There are two types of inflation targeting that central banks engage in. The first is strictinflation targeting, which means that the central bank is mainly concerned about keeping
inflation as close to the given inflation target as possible, and nothing else.2 The second is
flexible-inflation targeting, which means that central banks set their policy rate to stabilize
inflation around a target—generally, this target lies between inflation bands—and also to
stabilize the real economy, for instance, “stabilizing a measure of resource utilization such as
the output gap; that is, the gap between actual and potential output” (Svenson 2010). The
inflation band allows the central bank to exploit the potential short-run tradeoff between
inflation and output; that is, if a policymaker can expand aggregate demand, they can lower
unemployment, but only at the cost of higher inflation and if a policy maker contracts aggregate demand, they can lower inflation, but only at the cost of higher unemployment. The
inflation band allows for the possibility to exploit this trade-off while at the same time fulfill
the inflation target. The divide in the inflation-targeting regimes among central banks comes
from the following critiques starting with strict inflation targeting, the critiques are as follows.
Critique of strict-inflation targeting regimes:


Strict-inflation targeting countries put too little emphasis on the real economy, such
as unemployment and production.



Strict targeting cannot stimulate demand sufficiently when the interest rate is close to
its lower bound, which has been a problem in recent years.3

1

Output gap is defined as actual output at time t minus the potential output, where potential output is
a long-run average.
2
Svenson (2010) argues that in practice,“inflation targeting is never strict but always flexible, in the sense
that all inflation-targeting central banks put some weight on stabilizing the real economy”. I will explore
this notion in the analysis portion of the paper.
3
Even in countries with flexible targeting, inflation has been very low due to the drop in demand.
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Critique of flexible-inflation targeting regimes:


Under flexible-inflation targeting, subjective judgements regarding the appropriate
trade-off between inflation and the real economy can lead to a less well-balanced monetary policy.



Where the price-stability objective is expressed in the inflation target; there is no
stability objective expressed in a corresponding stability target, normally the natural
output, but it is hard to measure such a variable.



Finally, both strict and flexible inflation targeters take too little account of financial risks and imbalances—some argue this contributed unnecessarily to passive and
restrictive monetary policy during and after the 2008 financial crisis.

Despite the critiques of strict and flexible inflation targeting, there are obvious benefits to
the regimes. Strict-inflation targeting has proved effective in anchoring economic agents
inflation expectations. It creates a nominal anchor where the economic agents expect monetary policy to bring inflation back on target if it deviates. For example, if inflation deviates
from target, the economic agents expect the central bank to adjust monetary policy to bring
inflation back on target. Under this type of policy, economic agents do not expect the central
bank to compensate periods when inflation is above the target with periods of below-target
inflation and vice-versa. Under flexible-inflation targeting, in the short run an expansionary
monetary policy contributes to higher growth and lower unemployment—i.e. taking into
account unemployment and production may contribute to a more stable output.
Previous empirical evidence shows a direct relationship between inflation targeting and certain measures of economic performance indicating some support for the view that inflation
targeting improves overall macroeconomic performance. This support is derived from the
following results:4


Inflation targeting helps countries achieve lower inflation in the long run, have a more
muted inflation response to oil-price and exchange-rate shocks, strengthen monetary
policy independence, improve monetary policy efficiency and obtain inflation outcomes
closer to target levels.



Inflation volatility, inflation levels, and interest rates have declined once countries
adopted either targeting regime.



Inflation targeting leads to movements in the nominal exchange rate that are more
responsive to real shocks than nominal shocks—indicating inflation targeting may help
the nominal exchange rate act as a shock absorber for the real economy.

4

For evidence supporting these claims, see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Bernanke et all (1999),
Gonzalez, Cohen, and Powell (2003).
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Given the above discussion, it seems reasonable to assume that these relationships might
differ depending on what targeting regime a country adopts. The purpose of this paper is
to empirically examine which inflation-targeting regime gives rise to the lowest monetary
welfare losses, since its inception in 1989.
The loss function5 is of great importance to a central bank because central banks view
themselves as facing tradeoffs between inflation and output stabilization in the short run,
summarized by the Phillips Curve; therefore, central banks seek to minimize their loss function. This is accomplished by pursuing a policy that allows for a partial accommodation of
inflationary pressures in the short run, to avoid excessive instability in output and employment, while remaining committed to a medium-term inflation target (Gali, 2015).
My research question is motivated by the somewhat conflicting results in the literature
regarding the effect of the monetary policy mandate on the variability of the monetary loss
function, as well as the fact that major central banks around the world operate under different inflation-targeting regimes (Gali, 2015). For example, the European Central Bank
operates under a hierarchal mandate that requires stable prices as a condition of pursuing other goals (i.e. strict inflation targeting). The Federal Reserve operates under a dual
mandate that requires co-equal objectives of price stability and maximum sustainable employment (i.e. flexible inflation targeting). Other central banks target inflation bands (for
example the Reserve Bank of Australia), which allows for a degree of short-run inflation
variability; therefore, granting the central bank more room to exploit the short-run tradeoff
between the real economy and inflation. This regime can be interpreted as a form of flexible
inflation targeting, since the purpose is to allow inflation to vary within the band, which gives
the central bank more room to exploit the short-run tradeoff between output and inflation.
Section 2 of the paper describes the basic New Keynesian model and the underlying theory
that motivated my research question. Section 3 describes the data and presents descriptive
statistics. Section 4 includes the econometric methodology and results, and section 5 offers
concluding remarks.

2

New Keynesian Theory

Among mainstream academic economists and policymakers, the leading alternative to the
real business cycle theory is the New Keynesian model. Whereas the basic real business cycle
model features monetary neutrality6 , perfect competition, and emphasizes that there is no
role for stabilization policy by governments, the New Keynesian model builds in a friction
that generates monetary non-neutrality and gives rise to a welfare justification for activist
economic policies. The basic New Keynesian Model with Calvo price setting7 simplifies
to a system of two equations and a monetary policy rule setting the nominal interest rate
5

See section 1 for a formal definition of the loss-function
Monetary neutrality is when changes in the money supply do not influence real variables.
7
Calvo pricing incorporates “sticky prices” (see Calvo, 1983), this is when a fraction of firms are stuck
with their current prices with a constant probability (i.e. prices are fixed in the short run).
6

6

(see for example Gali, 2015). The two equations and the monetary policy rule are as follows:8
New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
and
θ
σ(1 − α) + ψ + α
(yt − ytn )
m̃ct = mct − mc =
(1 − α)

πt = βEt [πt+1 ] + λm̃ct , whereλ =

(1)

Where Et [πt+1 ] is expected inflation in time t+1, θ is the fraction of firms stuck with
their current prices, α is the output elasticity of labor, ψ is the elasticity of labor supply,
β is a discount factor between 0 and 1, σ is the households0 relative risk aversion, ytn is
potential output, (yt − ytn ) is the output gap, and mct is the marginal cost which is the labor
needed to produce an additional unit of output times the cost of each unit of that labor. In
steady state mct is constant over time. The economic intuition is as follows, according to (1)
inflation will tend to rise when the real marginal cost rises compared to the real marginal
cost in steady state, since firms want to pass on higher costs to consumers in the form of
higher prices. It also follows that a positive (negative) output gap puts upward (downward)
pressure on current inflation, since economic expansions (recessions) increases (decrease) aggregate demand and increases (decreases) firms pricing power.
Dynamic IS Curve:
ỹt = Et [ỹt+1 ] −

1
n
(it − Et [πt+1 ] − rtn ), where rtn = ρ + σEt [∆ỹt+1
]
σ

(2)

where ỹt ≡ yt − ytn is the output gap in period t, Et [yt+1 ] is expected output in time t + 1,
σ is the households relative risk aversion, it is the nominal interest rate set by the central
bank, Et [πt+1 ] is expected inflation in time t +1, ρ > 0 is the households0 discount rate, ∆
is the first difference operator, and rtn is the natural rate of interest. The natural rate of
interest can be defined as the equilibrium real rate of return when prices are fully flexible.
From equation (2), it follows that the output gap is proportional to the real interest rate
gap. One way of determining whether monetary policy is expansionary or contractionary is
to compare the actual real interest—where the real interest rate is (it − Et [πt+1 ]) in equation
(2)—with the natural rate of interest rtn . If the actual real interest rate is below the natural
interest rate, monetary policy is expansionary; if the actual real interest rate is above the
natural interest rate, monetary policy is contractionary.
Monetary Policy Rule:
it = ρ + φπ πt + φy ỹt ,

(3)

where φπ , φy are non-negative coefficients determined by the policy preferences of the central
bank. The coefficients describe the strength of the response to changes in inflation and the
output gap. As in equation (2), ρ has the same definition.

8

For complete derivations, see Gali 2015
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Monetary Loss Function:
E0

∞
X

β t (π̃t2 + ϑ x2t ),

(4)

t=0

where π̃t ≡ πt − πt∗ is inflation at time period t and πt∗ is equal to the inflation target at time
period t, xt ≡ yt − ytn , where yt is GDP at time period t and ytn denotes the potential level
of output at time period t, and ϑ is the coefficient for the weight of output gap fluctuations
relative to inflation, and is given by ϑ = κ/, where κ is the coefficient on the output gap,
(1−θ)(1−βθ) σ(1−α)+ψ+α
∗ (1−α) , and the variables have the same interpretation as in (1), and  is the
θ
elasticity of substitution between goods.
Optimal monetary policy under the New-Keynesian Model is to stabilize firms0 marginal
costs over time at a level consistent with their desired markup. Stabilizing marginal costs
over time eliminates mark-up fluctuations over time, which keeps aggregate prices stable
in steady state by the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. By (1), it also indicates that price
stability leads to a closed output gap. The output gap plays a central role in monetary policymaking. For many central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, maintaining maximum
sustainable employment is a policy goal. Maximum sustainable employment corresponds to
a maximum sustainable output or an output gap of zero. Nearly all central banks seek to
keep inflation under control, and the output gap is a key determinant of inflation pressure.
A central question for monetary decision makers is if there exist a trade-off between output
stabilization and inflation. Indeed, the notion of flexible inflation targeting highlights such
a short-run trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing output and employment.
By equation (1), price stability over time leads to a closed output gap. This is known
as the Divine Coincidence (Blanchard and Gali, 2005), which means that a central bank
doesn’t need to know what the natural or efficient level of output is, since the latter can be
attained automatically as a byproduct of a successful price stabilization policy (i.e. keeping
inflation constant). Hence, according to the notion of Divine Coincidence, there is no tradeoff between the stabilization of inflation and the stabilization of the output gap.
Some have argued that the Divine Coincidence does not necessarily hold in a non-linear
form of the standard New-Keynesian model. Specifically, the property would only hold if
the monetary authority is set to keep the inflation rate at exactly 0 % (see Alves, 2014).
However, attempts at evaluating the welfare performance of the so called Taylor rule have
shown that “the smallest welfare losses are attained when the monetary authority responds
to changes in inflation only. Furthermore, those losses (as well as the underlying fluctuations
in the output gap and inflation) become smaller as the strength of that response increases”
(Gali, 2015). Which raises the question: why do central banks differ in their approach
to inflation targeting? It would appear that the flexible-inflation targeting central banks
do not adhere to the notion of Divine Coincidence while other central banks seem to put
more emphasis on price stability in accordance with the prediction of the Divine Coincidence.
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Data

The data used in this study cover 36 countries for the period from 1989 to 2016.9 The
main macroeconomic variables such as, GDP (measured in current US dollars, scaled by 1
billion), inflation (consumer prices annual %), trade openness (Imports plus exports/GDP),
unemployment (annual %), domestic credit provided to financial sector (percent of GDP),
and public debt (percent of GDP) were collected from the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) using their World Development Indicators and World Economic Outlook databases, respectively.10 Measures of central-bank independence were collected from
Ana Carolina Garriga’s personal website.11 Central-bank independence is measured as a
number between 0 and 1 with unity signifying a completely independent bank. Another
variable of interest is the extent of political stability within a country. This was captured by
the Polity5 dataset. The polity score captures the regime authority spectrum on a point scale
ranging from -10 to 10, where the higher the number indicates a higher degree of political
stability.
Finally, I collected my main covariate of interest—type of inflation-targeting regime and
inflation target—from a variety of sources, which include: central-bank websites, monetarypolicy reports, and journal articles.12 I classified the regimes as flexible based on the following
criteria. If a country explicitly stated they were a strict or flexible-inflation targeter, I categorized them as such. If a country was not explicit in its choice of regime, I looked at their
inflation target history and if they allowed inflation to vary within a band, they were classified as flexible-inflation targeters, otherwise they were classified as strict-inflation targeters.
The type of inflation-targeting regime is captured by two binary variables. Strict-inflation
targeters are categorized as equal to 0 if the country has not yet adopted strict-inflation targeting and equal to 1 after they adopt strict-inflation targeting. Flexible-inflation targeters
are equal to 0 if the country has not yet adopted flexible-inflation targeting, and equal to 1
after the country adopts flexible-inflation targeting. The inflation target for a country is a
point target. If the country is a flexible inflation targeter and has a band around the inflation
target, I used the center of the band for the target. See graph 1 for the inflation targets of
the countries in the sample as well as the cross-country time variation of inflation.
[Table 1 Summary Statistics]
[Graph 1 Inflation and Inflation Targets by Country]
9

For a list of countries see graph 1
Some observations of inflation, GDP, domestic-credit, and public-debt were collected from the countries
respective central bank website.
11
Garriga, Ana Carolina. 2016. Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Dataset. International
Interactions 42 (5):849-868
12
See appendix for data sources.
10
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4

Econometric Methodology

In order to analyze the effects of inflation targeting regimes on monetary welfare losses, my
empirical strategy is to use a fixed effects model of the following form:
lossfunctionct = α1 + α2 Sct + α3 Fct + α4 Z1ct + δc + δt + 1ct ,

(5)

where lossfunctionct denotes the loss function in country c at time t. The loss function
is defined as the squared deviation in inflation from target in country c at time t divided
by 100 plus the squared deviation of the log of the output gap in country c at time t,
∗ 2
n 2
n
(πct − πct
) + (yct − yct
) , where yct and yct
are log transformed. This allows for the interpretation of the loss function to be in basis points. Sct is a dummy variable equal to one
if a country is a strict-inflation targeter in country c at time t, I expect α2 to be negative.
Fct is a dummy variable equal to one if a country is a flexible-inflation targeter in country c at time t, I expect α3 to be negative. Z1ct represents a vector of control variables,
α1 is an intercept, δc is a country fixed effect, δt is a time-specific fixed effect, and 1ct is
an error term capturing omitted factors, where E(1ct ) = 0 for all c and t. All regressions
are adjusted for intragroup correlation by clustering the standard errors on a country level.13
Nine variables are included in the vector Z1ct , they are as follows: international-oil price, domestic credit provided to the financial sector (% of GDP), central-bank independence, public
debt (% of GDP), political stability, and trade openness. In my analysis I will be applying
coequal weight to both the output gap and the deviation from target and will therefore not
be estimating ϑ.14 As for obtaining ytn , in practice ytn is hard to observe, but in theory
this is arguably a long-run average of GDP. In my analysis, I calculated ytn by applying a
Hodrick-Prescott time-series filter to filter out business cycle fluctuations in GDP.

4.1

Results

All the regression results in table 2 impose no restrictions on the direction of the sign of the
output gap and the sign of the deviation of inflation from its target. To determine the effect
of a demand and supply shock on the monetary loss function, I need to separate the case with
a positive output gap and an inflation above target from the case with a negative output gap
and an inflation below target. In the first case, the coefficients on domestic credit and public
debt are expected to be positive, since positive demand shocks, i.e. an expansionary fiscal
policy and easier credit conditions, increase welfare losses when the output gap is positive
and inflation is above target.The coefficient on the oil price is expected to be positive, since
a negative supply shock, i.e. a higher oil price, increases welfare losses when the output gap
13

This relaxes the usual requirement that the observations are independent, that is, observations are
independent across countries, but not necessarily within countries. The choice to use clustered standard
errors is as follows: while fixed effects removes unobserved heterogeneity between different groups in the
model, it does not account for observations that are not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d).
Since I have multiple observations of countries across time there may still be some unexplained variation in
the dependent variable that is correlated across time. For example, if there was an economic downturn in
the previous period there is a high probability that an economic downturn will continue in the next period.
14
Data is not sufficient to estimate the coefficient on weight.
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is positive and inflation is above target. The reason is that a negative supply shock decreases
the natural level of output and increases inflation, which increases the output gap and the
deviation of inflation from target at a time when the output gap is positive and inflation is
above target. In the second case, I expect the coefficients on domestic credit and public debt
to be negative, since expanding credit at a time when output is below the natural level can
indicate an economic expansion is underway. The oil price is still expected to have a positive coefficient because a negative supply shock at a time when output is below the natural
level will push the economy further from its natural level, thus increasing monetary-welfare
losses.15 These results would be expected to hold irrespective of the targeting regime applied.
[Table 2]
From the first model in table 2, only using the dummy variables for targeting regime in
the regression, it shows that both types of targeting regimes have negative coefficients. Both
of the coefficients on the inflation-targeting regimes are significant, they indicate that on average a strict-targeting regime lowers welfare losses by 1.38 basis points from its pre period
and a flexible-targeting regime lowers welfare losses by 3.18 basis points from its pre period.
After adding in a supply shock, the oil price, in model 2 the coefficient is significant and
has a negative coefficient, indicating a negative supply shock will decrease welfare losses.
However, this result is somewhat misleading because there are no restrictions placed on the
direction of the output gap or the deviation from inflation. For strict-targeting countries,
welfare losses are now reduced by 1.2 basis points, slightly less than in model 1, but still
significant. The coefficient on flexible-inflation targeters remains significant and now reduces
welfare losses by 3.02 basis points on average. After adding in financial-demand shocks such
as domestic credit lent by the financial sector and public debt in model 3 (both represented
as a percent of GDP) only domestic credit is statistically significant and a 10% increase in
domestic credit lent by the financial sector increases welfare losses by .00589 basis points on
average.
In model 4 I account for trade openness, which I would expect to have a negative coefficient. Countries that are more open tend have more synchronized business cycles with the
rest of the world. It is reasonable to assume that the business cycle of the world economy,
which is a weighted average of the business cycle of several countries, to fluctuate less than
the business cycle of a single country. Therefore, fluctuations in the real economy, as well
as in inflation, should be lower in more open economies, leading to lower monetary-welfare
losses as openness increases. However, in this model although the coefficient is negative it is
statistically insignificant. In model 5 and 6 I add central bank independence and political
stability to the model. I would expect both the coefficients on central bank independence and
political stability to have negative coefficients. A more independent bank would be less likely
to succumb to political pressures and more likely to pursue an optimal policy that stabilizes
the real economy and inflation around the target, which translates into lower monetary policy
losses. Moreover, politically stable countries are more likely to implement economic policies
that stabilizes the real economy and inflation leading to lower monetary-welfare losses. Af15

There are not sufficient observations in the data to test this hypothesis.
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ter taking these variables into account neither of the coefficients are statistically significant.
When the political stability variable is divided into separate categories the coefficient on
countries that are an open anocracy16 is significant and indicate that having an autocratic
regime increase welfare losses by nearly 3.5 basis points compared to having a full democracy.
Table 3 shows the regression imposing the restriction that the output gap is positive while
inflation is above the target. I account for this by restricting the sample to only observations that meet that criteria. Now, both strict and flexible-inflation targeting dummies
are still significant and the coefficient on strict-inflation targeters is larger than the unrestricted estimations, while the coefficient on flexible-inflation targeters is smaller than the
unrestricted estimations. Strict-targeting central banks decrease monetary-welfare losses by
1.5 basis points compared to their post period and flexible-targeting central banks decrease
their welfare losses by 2.04 basis points compared to their post period.
The oil price is insignificant throughout all of the models in table 3 and has a negative
coefficient, which was not the predicted sign. A reason for this may be because when actual
output is above the natural level a negative oil supply shock will shift the short-run aggregate supply curve upward, which will push output towards its natural level—decreasing
monetary-welfare losses. Public debt seems to have no effect on monetary-welfare losses,
while domestic credit lent by the financial sector does. A 10% increase in domestic credit
increases monetary-welfare losses by .00819 basis points. Trade openness and central bank
independence are also insignificant throughout the models, while certain types of political
regimes have an increasing effect on monetary-welfare losses. Compared to a full democracy,
a democratic regime will increase monetary-welfare losses by 1.54 basis points and an open
anocracy increases monetary-welfare losses by 4.5 basis points. The other types of political
regimes are insignificant I believe this is due to the small number of countries in the sample
that are classified as that type of political regime. Countries that are closed and open anocracies only make up 5% of the data.
[Table 3]

4.2

Robust Estimations

For my analysis in tables 2 and 3, I applied coequal weight to both the deviation in inflation
and the output gap. However, as previously noted in section 1, in practice inflation targeting is always flexible and never strict, in the sense that all central banks place some weight
on the real economy. Therefore, I will be applying a ϑ of 1/3 to strict-inflation targeting
countries0 loss function and a ϑ of 1/2 to flexible-inflation targeting countries0 loss function.
The loss function is defined the same way as in (5), except for the inclusion of ϑ on the
log transformed output gap, which represents central-bank emphasis on the real economy.17
16

An anocracy is defined as a regime that mixes democratic and autocratic features.
The weights of central bank emphasis on the real economy are not representative of any one central
bank. The weights were chosen to show that strict-targeting central banks place less emphasis on the real
economy than flexible-inflation targeters.
17
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After accounting for central-bank emphasis on the real economy, model 6 in table 4 exhibits
consistent results compared to table 3. Now, a strict-inflation targeting country reduces welfare losses by 1.7 basis points from its pre period, and flexible-inflation targeting countries
reduce welfare losses by 2.15 basis points from its pre period. Both regimes reduce welfare
losses by a greater amount after applying central-bank emphasis to the real economy. This
makes intuitive sense because the central banks are now applying a smaller weight on the
real economy than in table 3. Therefore, the central banks will not be penalized as much for
deviations in the output gap. The effect of domestic credit has the same interpretation as in
table 3, a 10% increase in domestic credit increase welfare losses by .0077 basis points. This
is because the economy is already in a state of expansion due to high demand and an increase
in domestic credit will further push actual output from its potential output, increasing the
output gap and thus contributing to larger monetary-welfare losses.
[Table 4]

5

Conclusion

It appears that both inflation-targeting regimes are effective in reducing monetary-welfare
losses. Both strict and flexible-targeting regimes have lower monetary-welfare losses after
the adoption of the regime, which provides evidence for the Divine Coincidence under stricttargeting regimes, since arguably a country with no monetary policy regime has relatively
less well-anchored inflation expectations and relatively higher variability in prices over time;
furthermore, responses to inflation only, such as under strict targeting, can approximate
arbitrarily well the optimal policy. This is an extremely interesting result. Based on the
notion of a central bank trying to minimize monetary-policy losses, it asserts that a central bank can only focus on inflation and perform as well as a flexible-targeting central bank
that places emphasis on and responds to fluctuations in the real economy as well as inflation.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean Std. Dev. Min.
Loss Function
0.402
6.415
0
Country
25.639
15.015
2
Year
2002.5
8.082
1989
Inflation(annual %)
11.52
62.14
-4.48
Strict Targeter
0.485
0.5
0
Flexible Targeter
0.224
0.417
0
Trade Openness
82.386
49.402
0
Oil price
46.604
33.11
12.719
CB Independence
0.603
0.245
0
Political Stability
8.579
3.485
-7
Full Democracy
0.663
0.473
0
Democracy
0.258
0.438
0
Open Anocracy
0.024
0.153
0
Closed Anocracy
0.025
0.156
0
Autocracy
0.031
0.173
0
Public Debt(% of gdp)
57.085
38.031
0.318
Domestic Credit(% of GDP) 109.614
60.799
0.23
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Max.
164.205
50
2016
1281.4
1
1
410.172
111.96
0.899
10
1
1
1
1
1
264.443
316.613

N
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008
1008

Table 2: Fixed Effects (no restrictions)
(1)
Model 1
-0.0138∗∗
(0.00472)

(2)
Model 2
-0.0120∗
(0.00460)

(3)
Model 3
-0.0131∗∗
(0.00470)

(4)
Model 4
-0.0131∗∗
(0.00470)

(5)
Model 5
-0.0110∗
(0.00426)

(6)
Model 6
-0.0103∗
(0.00403)

-0.0318∗
(0.0119)

-0.0302∗
(0.0114)

-0.0293∗
(0.0115)

-0.0293∗
(0.0114)

-0.0268∗
(0.0111)

-0.0284∗
(0.0123)

-0.0000403∗∗
(0.0000123)

-0.0000782∗∗∗
(0.0000200)

-0.0000782∗∗∗
(0.0000200)

-0.0000690∗∗∗
(0.0000175)

-0.0000682∗∗∗
(0.0000181)

Domestic Credit

0.0000589∗∗
(0.0000214)

0.0000588∗∗
(0.0000213)

0.0000514∗∗
(0.0000187)

0.0000525∗∗
(0.0000175)

Public Debt

-0.00000743
(0.0000124)

-0.00000736
(0.0000125)

-0.00000586
(0.0000110)

1.39e-08
(0.0000129)

-0.00000229
(0.0000178)

-0.00000511
(0.0000190)

0.00000142
(0.0000212)

CB Independence

-0.00406
(0.00683)

-0.00552
(0.00701)

Political Stability

-0.00142
(0.000841)

Strict Targeting

Flexible Targeting

Oil Price

Trade Openness

Democracy

0.0135
(0.00863)

Open Anocracy

0.0359∗
(0.0145)

Closed Anocracy

0.0115
(0.0110)

Autocracy

0.0431
(0.0269)

Constant
N
R-Square(within)

0.0233∗∗∗
(0.00363)
973
0.174

0.0240∗∗∗
(0.00376)
973
0.178

0.0199∗∗∗
(0.00336)
973
0.191

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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0.0201∗∗∗
(0.00340)
973
0.191

0.0338∗∗∗
(0.00713)
973
0.206

0.0158∗∗
(0.00505)
973
0.236

Table 3: Fixed Effects (with restrictions)
Strict Targeting

Flexible Targeting

(1)
Model 1
-0.0162∗∗
(0.00566)

(2)
Model 2
-0.0170∗∗
(0.00590)

(3)
Model 3
-0.0188∗∗
(0.00601)

(4)
Model 4
-0.0187∗∗
(0.00592)

(5)
Model 5
-0.0173∗∗
(0.00601)

(6)
Model 6
-0.0155∗∗
(0.00549)

-0.0241∗
(0.00932)

-0.0248∗∗
(0.00892)

-0.0222∗
(0.00847)

-0.0221∗
(0.00840)

-0.0205∗∗
(0.00744)

-0.0204∗
(0.00762)

Oil Price

0.0000141
(0.0000254)

-0.0000413 -0.0000418 -0.0000330
(0.0000331) (0.0000316) (0.0000309)

-0.0000291
(0.0000325)

Domestic Credit

0.0000854∗ 0.0000855∗
(0.0000336) (0.0000335)

0.0000781∗
(0.0000308)

0.0000819∗∗
(0.0000290)

Public Debt

-0.0000775 -0.0000775
(0.0000541) (0.0000541)

-0.0000791
(0.0000564)

-0.0000628
(0.0000384)

0.00000410
(0.0000489)

0.00000548
(0.0000503)

0.0000201
(0.0000524)

CB Independence

-0.00195
(0.0114)

-0.00702
(0.0113)

Political Stability

-0.00118
(0.00160)

Trade Openness

Democracy

0.0154∗∗
(0.00537)

Open Anocracy

0.0449∗
(0.0170)

Closed Anocracy

-0.00240
(0.0125)

Autocracy

0.0446
(0.0511)

Constant
N
R-Square(within)

0.0226∗∗∗
(0.00287)
334
0.140

0.0223∗∗∗
(0.00302)
334
0.140

0.0207∗∗∗
(0.00534)
334
0.170

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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0.0203∗∗
(0.00566)
334
0.170

0.0309∗
(0.0119)
334
0.179

0.0137
(0.00801)
334
0.247

Table 4: Fixed Effects (Robustness Check)
(1)
Model 1
-0.0191∗∗
(0.00581)

(2)
Model 2
-0.0191∗∗
(0.00591)

(3)
Model 3
-0.0209∗∗
(0.00610)

(4)
Model 4
-0.0209∗∗
(0.00604)

(5)
Model 5
-0.0188∗∗
(0.00619)

(6)
Model 6
-0.0170∗∗
(0.00569)

-0.0264∗
(0.00986)

-0.0264∗∗
(0.00937)

-0.0237∗
(0.00888)

-0.0237∗
(0.00880)

-0.0216∗∗
(0.00764)

-0.0215∗∗
(0.00786)

0.000000680
(0.0000225)

-0.0000529
(0.0000316)

-0.0000529
(0.0000305)

-0.0000415
(0.0000278)

-0.0000374
(0.0000290)

Domestic Credit

0.0000828∗
(0.0000331)

0.0000828∗
(0.0000328)

0.0000738∗
(0.0000295)

0.0000777∗∗
(0.0000275)

Public Debt

-0.0000915
(0.0000581)

-0.0000915
(0.0000581)

-0.0000933
(0.0000607)

-0.0000771
(0.0000414)

Strict Targeting

Flexible Targeting

Oil Price

Trade Openness

-0.000000390 0.000000876 0.0000155
(0.0000478) (0.0000491) (0.0000509)

CB Independence

-0.00357
(0.0116)

Political Stability

-0.00135
(0.00162)

-0.00865
(0.0114)

Democracy

0.0164∗
(0.00642)

Open Anocracy

0.0470∗
(0.0178)

Closed Anocracy

-0.000107
(0.0124)

Autocracy

0.0481
(0.0512)

Constant
N
R-Square(within)

0.0228∗∗∗
(0.00299)
334
0.180

0.0227∗∗∗
(0.00316)
334
0.180

0.0220∗∗∗
(0.00560)
334
0.212

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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0.0221∗∗∗
(0.00575)
334
0.212

0.0348∗∗
(0.0122)
334
0.224

0.0157
(0.00822)
334
0.292
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